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Abstract
In the last decades supply chains emerged that stretch across many countries. This
has been explained with decreasing trade and communication costs. We extend the
literature by analyzing if and how unilateral environmental regulation induces off-
shoring to unregulated jurisdictions. We first apply an analytical partial-equilibrium
model of a two-stage production process that can be distributed between two coun-
tries and investigate unilateral emission pricing and its supplementation with bor-
der carbon taxes. To get a more comprehensive picture, we subsequently apply
a computable general equilibrium model that includes a better representation of
international supply chains. We find heterogeneous, but mostly positive effects of
a unilateral carbon emission reduction by the European Union on the degree of
vertical specialisation of European industries and explain these differences by het-
erogeneity in the emission-intensity and pre-policy vertical specialisation of sectors.
Border taxes are successful in protecting upstream industries, but with negative
side effects for downstream industries.
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1 Introduction
Actuated by decreasing trade, transportation and communication costs, supply chains
that stretch across many countries have emerged in the last decades. Dietzenbacher, Pei,
and Yang (2012) for example report that exports of processed goods, where the major
part of intermediates are imported from abroad and then assembled for re-exporting,
accounted for more than 50 percent of China’s exports in the period 1996-2007. Much has
been written about the emergence of off-shoring and vertical specialisation. Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) argued that this fundamentally changed the nature of international
trade and state that “[i]ts not wine for cloth anymore”.
According to Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), who used input-output data for the
years 1970 to 1990 to compute international trade induced by vertical specialisation, most
supply chains in this timespan integrated only industries from industrialized countries.
But in a process that Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (forthcoming) termed “globalization’s
second unbundling”, less developed countries have been integrated in these supply chains
too. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, 2012) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012)
explain the evolution of such supply chains with decreasing costs of managerial efforts to
supervise and assure the quality of processed intermediate goods.
Although it is indisputable that the technological advancements that reduced commu-
nication and trade costs are the most important driver of the emergence of global supply
chains, we argue that differences in regulation between countries provide additional incen-
tives to offshore certain production stages to countries with lower regulation costs. An ev-
ident example are differences in environmental regulation. Developed countries have often
more stringent environmental regulations compared to developing ones. The well-known
pollution haven hypothesis argues that polluting industries escape from environmental
regulation in developed countries by moving to unregulated developing countries. This
in turn makes unilateral environmental regulation less effective. The most prominent ex-
ample is the so-called “carbon leakage effect” which proposes that a unilateral regulation
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may rise production costs of carbon-intensive goods
and reduce the competitiveness of producers in regulated countries, leading to a shift of
production to unregulated ones.
But industries may respond to regulation not only with a complete shift of the pro-
duction but with the offshoring of single production stages along the vertical supply chain
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and thereby contribute to the “second unbundling”. In spite of the large literature on
how international trade affects the effectiveness of environmental regulation, almost all
studies assess the topic through the lens of “horizontal specialisation”, i.e. specialisation
in final goods, and ignoring the role of intermediate goods. Exceptions are the papers of
Benarroch and Weder (2006) and McAusland (2004) which study trade in intermediates
and their environmental consequences in industries with increasing returns to scale, but
focus rather on the economies of scale than the disentangling of the supply chain effects.
Including the supply chain effects in the analysis has also important implications for
policy conclusions. Most analysis of unintended side effects of unilateral carbon emis-
sion regulation focus on so called “energy intensive, trade exposed” industries which are
characterized by the high energy use of their final production stage, their high export
shares, and the high substitutability of their goods on international markets. But this
classification ignores the sectors vulnerability to upstream supply chain disruptions and
the emissions embodied in the supply chains. Since more than half of international trade
volumes are trade in intermediates, this may have important consequences for policy de-
sign.1 This paper aims to close this gap by analyzing the effects on the supply chain
composition of two unilateral environmental policy measures.
We first investigate a sole emission price paid by domestic industries. Examples are
the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) that regulates carbon emissions
in most EU energy-intensive industries or the SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading in
the United States. Subsequently, we study the effects of a carbon price in combination
with a tax on imported embodied emissions. Although it has so far not been applied in
practice, a border tax on carbon has been widely debated – both among academics and
policy makers – as a supplement to climate policy measures in order to respond to the
losses in competitiveness and effectiveness that accompany such measures if implemented
unilaterally. The idea was incorporated for example in the Waxman/Markey bill (H.R.
2454 “The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009”), an in the end unsuccessful
attempt to regulate U.S. carbon emissions, but has also been discussed in Europe in
addition to the EU ETS.2
1Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010) report that in 2006 56 percent on total world imports were inter-
mediate goods.
2See Markusen (1975) and Copeland (1996) for an early analysis. They find that a border tax belongs
to the optimal policy portfolio in case of an unilateral regulation of trans-boundary pollutants. More
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In order to illustrate the general effects those regulations have on offshoring decisions,
we use in a first step a partial equilibrium model of a two stage production process with
two regions. The model blends Ricardian international trade in a continuum of goods
(Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 1977) and multi-stage production as in Yi (2003)
with a model of a pollutant-emitting production as in Copeland and Taylor (1994). Not
surprisingly, we find that emission pricing polices force more emission-intensive producers
to shift a greater share of their supply chain to the unregulated region and thereby in-
creasing vertical specialisation. Border taxation of emissions in turn retains these stages
at home that would be off-shored due to the unilateral regulation alone. But this comes at
the cost of losing market shares in non-regulated regions for goods depending on emission-
intensive, and thus more costly, upstream intermediates. This effect could, at least in
theory, even cause an increase in carbon leakage rates.
In reality, supply chains are a complex interweaved network of sectoral relationships.
So, eventually, we extend the partial equilibrium model and apply a new full fledged
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model featuring for the first time an explicit spec-
ification of international trade flows between sectors in different regions. This feature
is vital for studying changes in global supply chains as it allows to trace intermediate
flows through the global economy. The CGE model is calibrated to the multi-regional
input-output data of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) that maps trade flows
between sectors and regions. We solve this model numerically to analyse the effect of a
20 percent carbon emission reduction through an ETS in the EU – a stylized representa-
tion of the EU’s emission reduction targets for 2020 – on the supply chains of European
industries. As in the analytical model and counterfactual, we supplement this policy with
a border tax on imported carbon emitted in unregulated regions. The simulated results
show that a unilateral 20 percent emission reduction in the EU has heterogeneous impacts
on the induced offshoring, measured as the change in foreign factor content in domestic
output, of industries depending on the emission-intensity of their supply chain. The pat-
tern is however more diverse compared to the analytical model, which can be explained
by heterogeneity in pre-policy vertical specialization and substitution elasticities. If the
domestic carbon price is complemented with a border carbon tax, vertical specialisation
recently, Fischer and Fox (2012) provide a numerical analysis of specific border carbon tax schemes,
showing that these schemes can support domestic competitiveness but have almost no effect on global
carbon emissions.
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decreases in virtually all sectors, again with the largest impact on emission-intensive sec-
tors. However, almost all European sectors that are subject to the border carbon tax
have to cope with a small market share loss in foreign regions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we lay out
the analytical model and illustrate the general effects of unilateral regulation on vertical
specialisation. Subsequently, we enlarge the model. Before applying the CGE model,
the current state of fragmentation in the production of European final goods and their
consequence in terms of foreign emission embodied in European goods is briefly examined.
Next, we investigate the implications of the two policies on vertical specialisation in the
numerical model and contrast our findings with the analytical model. Finally, we conclude
and discuss the policy implications of our results.
2 An Analytical Framework of Offshoring
In this section, we lay out an analytical model that provides intuition how environmental
regulation can affect offshoring decisions of fragments of the supply chain. The model
blends Ricardian international trade in the tradition of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuel-
son (1977) and multi-stage production as in Yi (2003) with a model of different emission-
intensive industries as in Copeland and Taylor (1994). This provides a tool to examine
the effects of environmental policy on the vertical organization of industries. However, the
analysis is for now kept as simple as possible and ignores general equilibrium effects on
factor prices and on final demand. For analytical tractability, the analyzed supply chains
contain only two stages where a single upstream good is used in the downstream industry
and emission-intensity varies between supply chains but not within. These limitations will
be addressed below with a more inclusive calibrated general equilibrium model. Neverthe-
less, the simplified analytical framework provides important insights about the mechanics
of offshoring under environmental regulation.
2.1 Firms and Technology
We consider a world with two regions r, called North (N) and South (S). Following
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), there is a continuum of goods, indexed by
z ∈ [0, 1]. Each good z is produced with a single production factor in two stages, a
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upstream (stage 1) and a downstream stage (stage 2) and differs in its emission-intensity
of production. Emissions eventually have negative effects on welfare and are thus going
to be regulated by an exogenous policy maker, but initially they do no adverse effects on
output. The upstream good is a required intermediate input in the downstream industry
which eventually produces the final good. We assume constant returns to scale on both
stages of production and zero profit in all industries. Further, we assume constant factor
prices and no factor mobility across countries but between sectors.
2.1.1 Upstream Firms
As in Copeland and Taylor (1994) the upstream production of any good z combines factor
l and emissions d in a Cobb-Douglas fashion.3
y1r(d
1
r, l
1
r ; z) =


(A1rl
1
r)
1−α(z)
d1r
α(z)
if d1r ≤ λl
1
r
0 if d1r > λl
1
r ,
(1)
where 0 ≤ 1 − α(z) ≤ 1 is the value share of factor l and 0 ≤ α(z) ≤ 1 is the emission
intensity, both vary across industries. Thereby we assume that every good z is produced
with the same emission intensity α(z) along its supply chain.4 A1r can be interpreted
as a stage specific, factor augmenting technology used by region r in stage 1. λ > 0 is
a technology efficiency parameter that limits the substitution between factor input and
emissions because output must be bounded above for a given factor input. Therefore,
production sets where d1r > λl
1
r are not feasible (see Copeland and Taylor (1994)). In
order to avoid corner solutions, we focus on cases where d1r ≤ λl
1
r . In those cases, the unit
costs of a upstream firm in region r can be characterized by
c1r(τr, wr, A
1
r; z) = φ(z)τ
α(z)
r
(
wr
A1r
)1−α(z)
, (2)
3Although a joint product of output in most production processes, we follow Copeland and Taylor
(1994) and model emissions as input. This requires that the joint production technologies satisfy certain
regularity conditions. See the Appendix of Copeland and Taylor (1994) for a detailed derivation.
4Assuming that all production stages feature the same emission intensity is a strong assumption
but limits the dimensionality of production and allows for an easier understanding of the supply chain
effects. However, the assumption is relaxed later in the paper when we extend the analysis to a more
comprehensive general equilibrium context.
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where φ(z) = (1 − α(z))α(z)−1α(z)−α(z) is an industry specific constant, τr describes the
input costs of a unit emissions and wr is the price of the factor. Note that in order to
avoid corner solutions τr has to be strictly positive.
2.1.2 Downstream Firms
The upstream output y1r(z) is a required intermediate input in the downstream production
of good z. Upstream products from N and S are perfect substitutes and trade costs are
zero, thus the intermediate input will always be sourced from only one region. Following Yi
(2003), emissions, the factor input, and the upstream intermediate input are compounded
in a nested Cobb-Douglas production function.
y2r(x
2
r,s, d
2
r, l
2
r ; z) =


[
(A2rl
2
r)
1−α(z)
d2r
α(z)
]1−θ
x2r,s
θ
if d2r ≤ λl
2
r
0 if d2r > λl
2
r ,
(3)
where x2r,s is region r’s use of the upstream good from region s and, similar to stage 1,
A2r is a stage- and region-specific technology that determines factor productivity of stage
2 in region r. θ is the value share of upstream goods in the downstream industry, which
we assume to be constant across industries. Similar to the upstream stage, production
sets with d2r > λl
2
r are not feasible. Downstream output of industry z in region r has unit
costs of
c2r(τr, wr, p
1
s; z) = ψ(z)
[
τα(z)r
(
wr
A2r
)1−α(z)]1−θ (
argmin
[
p1N(z), p
1
S(z)
])θ
, (4)
where ψ(z) = (1− θ)θ−1θ−θφ(z)1−θ is a downstream industry specific constant and p1s(z)
is the input cost of the upstream intermediate from region s faced by the downstream
producer that minimizes her costs.
In order to allow for a clear cut analysis, we structure our economy further and focus
on the set of goods that are originally produced entirely in the North. For this a minimal
set of additional assumptions are required. In the following, we assume that 1 ≤
(
wN
wS
)
≤(
A1
N
A1
S
)
≤
(
A2
N
A2
S
)
, meaning that N ’s relative wage is lower than its productivity of factor
l used in both production stages. This eventually implies that in the absence of any
unilateral environmental policy (i.e. τN equals τS) up- and downstream production take
both place in the North. The third inequality
(
A1
N
A1
S
)
≤
(
A2
N
A2
S
)
implies that the North has
a relative comparative advantage in the downstream stage. Since Ricardian comparative
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advantage forces determine the composition of the supply chain in equilibrium, a unilateral
increase in production costs in N – e.g. induced by an increase in emission costs – affects
at the margin first the location of upstream production before downstream production is
considered to be offshored. This situation defines the baseline for our analysis.
2.2 Offshoring due to Unilateral Environmental Regulation
We turn our attention to two types of policies that have been widely discussed in the
literature on environmental regulation in open economies. First, a unilateral increase in
the costs of emissions in the North – either caused through an emission tax or through a
tightened cap in an ETS that reduces the supply of emission permits and thus increases
emission costs – is examined. Subsequently, we analyse the implications of complement-
ing the unilateral emission pricing with a border tax of the North on imported embodied
emissions from the South. Both instruments are challenged with the questions (i) how
the respective instrument affects the vertical organizational structure of emission-emitting
industries and (ii) how the adjustment of supply chains affects the effectiveness of the reg-
ulation. Note that although we acknowledge that offshoring decisions and the unbundling
of supply chains are mostly driven by many factors such as reductions in communication
and trade costs, we remain here agnostic about those driver and focus on environmental
regulation as the only offshoring-inducing determinant.5
2.2.1 Unilateral Emission Pricing
Our starting point is our baseline scenario, where we assume that τN equals τS and is
positive. Now suppose that a policy in N unilaterally increases the costs of emissions,
either by an increasing emission tax or by a reduced supply of emission permits under a
constant demand of such permits, and therefore τN > τS.
A purchasing manager in the downstream (stage 2) industry has to decide where to
source its intermediate input. She buys the intermediate upstream good used in sector z
from region S if c1S(τS, wS; z) ≤ c
1
N(τN , wN ; z). The input costs of the upstream good in
the downstream industry is thus p1(z) = argmin[c1S(τS , wS; z), c
1
N(τN , wN ; z)]. This makes
the downstream production in the South conditioned on:
5See for example Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (forthcoming) for an excellent overview about the the
role of trade and communication costs.
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A1 ≡
A1N
A1S
≤
wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (5)
Conversely, the upstream good will be sourced from N if A1 ≥ ωT (z). With τN > τS
and α(z) > 0, T (z) is increasing in z. Because of North’s relatively higher emission
prices, its relative cost advantage in producing the upstream part of good z declines as
expenditures for emissions make up a larger share of total costs.
The cut-off emission intensity α(z) of the upstream sector z where the purchasing
manager is indifferent between offshoring its upstream production to S or keeping it in
N can be be found by equalizing inequality (5) and solving for α(z). This leads to:
α(z) =
ln
(
A1
ω
)
ln
(
τN
τS
)
+ ln
(
A1
ω
) = α. (6)
Note that the greater the difference between τN and τS, the lower is the cut-off emission
intensity. The same calculus is then used by the final consumers in both regions. Goods of
different origin are perfect substitutes and there are no trade costs. Thus, they source the
final good z from S if c2S(τS , wS, p
1; z) ≤ c2N(τN , wN , p
1; z). We can rewrite this purchase
decision as:
A2 ≡
A2N
A2S
≤
wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (7)
The final good is purchased from the North if A2 ≥ ωT (z). From A1 < A2 and
Ricardian comparative advantage forces it follows that in equilibrium the final good is
never produced in the South if the upstream good is sourced in the North. Equalizing (7)
and solving the cut-off emission intensity α(z) of industry z, for which the final consumer
is indifferent between purchasing the final good z from S or N , shows that:
α(z) =
ln (A
2
ω
)
ln ( τN
τS
) + ln (A
2
ω
)
= α. (8)
Thus, every industry with an emission intensity equal or higher than α shifts their
entire production to S. Combining (5) and (7) allows to study the industry structure for
given emission prices. Three different production patterns are possible: A good z can
either (i) be produced entirely in N , it can (ii) be produced entirely in S, or (iii) it can
consist of a Southern upstream good that is processed to a final good in N . The latter
describes policy-induced vertical specialisation.
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Figure 1: Vertical specialisation at the extensive margin.
Vertical specialisation at the extensive margin. If policy induces a discrete shift
in the structure of the supply chain, such that upstream and downstream production
is located in different regions, we define this as vertical specialisation at the extensive
margin. Industry z produces vertically specialized and offshores its upstream production
from the North to the South if:
A1 ≤ ωT (z) ≤ A2. (9)
The offshoring decisions at the extensive margin of the different emission-intensive
industries are illustrated in Figure 1. Following Copeland and Taylor (1994), we rank
goods according to their emission-intensity which is a strictly increasing function of α.
The supply chains of industries with emission-intensities of α(z) ≤ α(z) are not affected
by an increase of N ’s emission prices. The production of both stages still takes place
in N . When emission costs account only for a small share of overall costs, comparative
advantages based on relative production technologies determine the supply chain. But
ωT (z) has an upward slope. With increasing emission intensity and thus increasing share
of emission costs, the ωT (z) locus cuts A1 at α from below. We know from condition
(5) that if A1 < ωT (z) the upstream production stage is off-shored to S. But below
the A2-line, the final good processing remains in N . With increasing emission-intensity,
ωT (z) cuts the A2-line and the technological comparative advantage of N ’s downstream
production stage is dominated by the disadvantage in emission costs for α(z) ≥ α. Thus,
the final good processing shifts to S as well.
Insight 1. A unilateral relative increase in emission costs fragments the supply chain
and induces offshoring at the extensive margin for medium emission-intensive industries
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between α and α.
The offshoring of the upstream stage of emission-intensive industries to less regulated
regions reduces the effectiveness of the unilateral policy and results in so-called carbon
leakage. We will asses the magnitude of this effect by using a calibrated CGE model in
the next section.
Vertical specialisation at the intensive margin. Since we are interested in the
strength of offshoring effects, we focus now on industries with emission-intensities between
α < α < α where environmental regulation results in fragmented supply chains. We
define the change in upstream foreign factor content in the domestic downstream output
as vertical specialisation at the intensive margin. The change in unit demand for foreign
production factor in the upstream industry induced by a marginal change in the domestic
emissions costs can be expressed through the cross-price elasticity.
Applying Shepard’s Lemma to equation (4) leads to Hicksian demand for the foreign
production factor:
x2r,s(τr, wr, ps; z) =
∂c2r(τr, wr, ps; z)
∂ps
= ψ(z)
[
τα(z)r
(
wr
A2r
)1−α(z)]1−θ
θ
(
argmin
[
p1N(z), p
1
S(z)
])θ−1
.
(10)
The cross-price elasticity of unit demand for foreign production factor with respect to a
change in the domestic emissions prices for industry z is then:
χ(z) =
∂x2r,s(τr, wr, ps; z)
∂τr
τr
x2r,s(τr, wr, ps; z)
= α(z)− α(z)θ ∀ α < α(z) < α. (11)
As 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α(z) ≤ 1, this cross-price elasticity is always positive.
Insight 2. A unilateral marginal increase in North’s emission costs increases the intensity
of used foreign production factors from the the unregulated South and therewith vertical
specialisation at the intensive margin. The increase in foreign factor intensity is increasing
with the emission-intensity of industries.
The change in upstream factor intensity from non-regulated regions in the downstream
output of regulated industries will be our measure of regulation-induced offshoring, also
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when using the CGE model below. Changes in vertical specialisation at the intensive
margin also affect the origin of emissions. While the literature on carbon leakage mainly
has focused on changes in the location of production of final goods, leakage can also
arise through supply chain adjustments of regulated industries. As fragmented industries
increase the content of parts offshored to unregulated regions the overall production of
a good might become more emission-intensive. We investigate the magnitude of this
“within-supply chain” carbon leakage using the CGE model later in this paper.
2.2.2 Unilateral Emission Pricing with Border Emission Taxes
Suppose that the policy makers in the North want to tackle the adverse effects on com-
petitiveness and policy efficiency that N ’s unilateral environmental policy causes and add
a border tax on embodied emissions imported from S to the domestic emission regulation
set. The border tax aims at leveling the playing field on the domestic market and taxes
each unit of imported carbon emissions that has been used in the production of the good
with the difference in its respective emission price (τN − τS).
6
Border emission taxes on intermediate good markets. A unit of a upstream good
from industry z produced in S contains embodied emissions:
E1S(z) =
d1S
y1S
=
(
α(z)
1− α(z)
wS
τSA1S
)1−α(z)
.
(12)
The border emission tax applied on N ’s import in industry z of S’s upstream good is
thus t1N (z) = (τN − τS)×E
1
S(z). This term is positive and increases the sourcing costs of
intermediates in the N ’s downstream industry. A border carbon tax affects the offshoring
decision of N ’s final good industries and puts a wedge between the prices N and S
downstream purchasing managers face. The intermediate sourcing decision of final good
producers in S are not affected and are still described by condition (5). This, however, is
different for a downstream purchasing manager in N .
6Import taxes are often discussed in combination with export rebates (see e.g. Fischer and Fox (2012)).
We focus on import taxes, although the inclusion of export rebates may lead to different findings, in
particular in the analysis of final good markets. But where as the compatibility of border taxes with
international trade law is already heavily contested, this holds even more for export rebates.
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She faces additional costs when sourcing the intermediate input from S. Intermedi-
ate input costs in N ’s downstream industry z are now p1∗N (z) = argmin[c
1
S(τS, wS; z) +
t1N(z), c
1
N (τN , wN ; z)], where the asterisk indicates the border carbon tax regime and the
subscript the importing region. With some algebra we can derive the following condition:
Industry z, located in N , sources its intermediate input from S if:
A1Γ(z) ≡
A1N
A1S
(
α(z)τN + (1− α(z))τS
τS
) 1
1−α(z)
≤
wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (13)
Since τS < τN , S produces the same good z at least not less emission-intensive than
N . Thus, with border taxes the emission costs per unit imported to N are not lower for
any good z produced in S relative to N . As a consequence, under a border tax regime in
N , A1Γ(z) > ωT (z) holds for all α(z) if τN > τS. This implies that baseline Ricardian
comparative advantage forces dominate again and offshoring due to environmental regu-
lation is not a profitable motivation any more.7. So eventually downstream producers of
good z in N never offshore their upstream production to S.
Insight 3. Border emission taxes eliminate offshoring of upstream production stages and
fragmentation of supply chains that has been induced by unilateral emission pricing poli-
cies, both at the extensive and intensive margin.
Border emission taxes on final good markets. Since border taxes drive a wedge
between N and S good markets, also final consumers in N and S face different purchase
problems. As showed above, the supply chain of industry z is under a border tax regime
either completely located in S or N . Thus, no parts of goods that are traded on the S
markets crossed the border to N and are hence not affected by the border tax. However,
on N markets final goods are potentially available that are entirely produced in S and
taxed accordingly when reaching N markets.
By exploiting separability the unit cost function of a final good z produced entirely in
S is c2S = ψ(z)τ
α(z)
S w
1−α
S
(
A2S
1−θ
A1S
θ
)α(z)−1
. Shepard’s Lemma shows that one unit of the
final good z produced completely in S includes
E2S(z) =
(
α(z)
1− α(z)
wS
τSA
2
S
1−θ
A1S
θ
)1−α
(14)
7A formal proof is given in the Appendix A.1
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Figure 2: Profitability of industries on the S market in the presence of a border tax
units of emissions and the tax on imported final goods from S is thus t2S = (τN −
τS)E
2
S(z). The final consumer in N purchases the final good z from N if c
2
N(τN , wN ; z) ≤
c2S(τS, wS; z) + t
2
S. Rearranging this condition provides:
(A1)θ(A2)1−θ ≤ ωT (z)ϕ
1
1−α(z)Γ(z), (15)
where ϕ = (1− θ)1−θθθ. So again pre-policy Ricardian comparative advantages dominate
and the North relies only final goods produced entirely domestically.
Insight 4. A border tax on imported embodied emissions implemented by N prevents all
effects on N ’s final good market induced by N ’s unilateral emission pricing.
In the South, the situation looks slightly different. Consumers are not directly con-
fronted with the border tax. But indirectly, since under the border tax regime no goods are
available that have been produced in a fragmented manner. Ultimately, a final consumer
in S sources the final good from N if c2N(z) ≤ c
2
S(z), that is if:
(A1)θ(A2)1−θ ≤ ωT (z). (16)
This points out that consumers in S switch from final goods produced in N to goods
produced in S emission-intensive industries if the ωT (z)-locus cuts the (A1)θ(A2)1−θ-line
from below. Thus, in contrast to a regime with unilateral domestic emission pricing where
only fragmented supply chains emerged for industries with an emission intensity between
α and α, in a border tax regime all industries produce entirely domestically.
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Figure 2 shows the consequences for the industry structure over the good space z for
N industries that are active on S markets.
Insight 5. The effects of a border tax on imported embodied emissions by N to supplement
unilateral emission pricing are ambiguous: On the one hand, the border tax regime in N
makes more integrated industries competitive and suppresses the offshoring of upstream
production of industries between emission intensities α and αˆ. But on the other hand,
North looses competitiveness due to higher costs of intermediates for the more energy-
intensive industries αˆ and α.
With the change in the production setup, the presence of a border carbon tax also has
effects on the amount and origin of emissions. For goods sold on markets in the regulated
North the implications are straightforward: offshoring due to emissions regulation is not a
profitable strategy anymore and leakage becomes irrelevant. But the situation is different
for markets in the South, which now produces more for local markets.
Insight 6. On the one hand, border taxes by N reduce emissions because upstream pro-
cesses are brought back to N and N produces cleaner than S due to higher emission costs.
On the other hand, other industries now also move their downstream stages S and thus
increase the emissions. Depending on which of the effects is dominating, the border tax
can also increase carbon leakage.
3 Quantitative Assessment of Complex Supply Chains
The above described analytical partial equilibrium framework revealed several important
insights about the effect of unilateral regulation on the fragmentation of supply chains.
However, the model offered only a stylized representation of supply chain management
and ignored at least five important dimensions due to trade-offs with analytical tractabil-
ity. In this section, we extend the illustrative framework first and foremost to a general
equilibrium representation that includes interdependencies of factor and good markets.
Thus, supply chain adjustments may interact with each other. Second, we study trade
and offshoring relationships in a universe consisting of more than two regions. Third, final
goods are produced in more than two stages and their production can span over multi-
ple regions. Fourth, an intermediate good may be used in several industries, so supply
14
chains are not straight lines but complex interweaved networks of sectoral relationships.
Fifth, also the representation of industries is more complex. They vary not only their
emission-intensity but also in their ability to change the source of their upstream inputs,
their ability to substitute in the production process the intermediates with factor input,
and their intensity of upstream intermediate goods use.
3.1 Model Structure
To account for the aforementioned additional aspects and to quantify the effects of unilat-
eral regulation on vertical specialisation, we apply for the first time a unique CGE model
with an explicit specification of the origin as well as the destination of intermediate goods
flows on a regional and sectoral level (for a general description of the model, see Koesler
and Pothen (2013)).
Similar to our analytical model, production is modeled using constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) functions, although more nuanced with heterogeneity among regions
and industries regarding value shares and elasticities. The production of final output of
sector i in region r is described by:
yr,i =

θr,ixρldxr,ir,i + (1− θr,i) [(1− αr,i)lρldr,ir,i + αr,idρldi,rr,i ]
ρldxr,i
ρld
r,i


1
ρldx
r,i
. (17)
Note that industries are no longer distributed continuously but are discrete and of finite
number, indexed by i. Final output yr,i in industry i from region r is produced in a similar
structure as in the analytical model. On the first stage, a production factor composite
lr,i consisting of capital and labour is blended with a carbon-emitting energy input dr,i,
where σldr,i = 1/(1 − ρ
ld
r,i) denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs.
Each sector uses a fixed mix of energy sources, each with a specific carbon emissions
coefficient. Note that in contrast to the analytical model, also process emissions – a fixed
byproduct of sectoral production – are taken into account and affect the emission intensity
of a sector. On the second stage, the composite of factors of production and energy is
combined with a bundle of intermediate goods xr,i sourced from other sectors, where
σldxr,i = 1/(1 − ρ
ldx
r,i ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs. In
contrast to the analytical model, we account now for more complex production structures
and consider intermediates from various sectors. However, we assume that the mix of
15
yr,i σldxr,i
σldr,i
dr,i lr,i
xr,i
aj,r,i
σar,i
mr,j,r,i
σmmr,i
ms,j,r,i X . . .X
. . .
Figure 3: Production structure model of sector i in the CGE model. Dashed lines indicate
the extensions to the analytical model.
intermediates remains constant.
Each intermediate good aj,r,i used in sector i in region r consists of a combination of
domestic and foreign final inputs from sector j. While in the analytical model it has been
assumed that goods from different origin are perfect substitutes, now goods of different
origin are assumed to be only imperfect substitutes (Armington 1969), with an elasticity
of substitution parameter between domestic and foreign output ρar,i and between different
foreign regions ρmmr,i . Eventually, each intermediate input aj,r,i arises from
aj,r,i =

βj,r,imr,j,r,iρar,i + (1− βj,r,i)
(∑
s∀s 6=r
γs,j,r,i(ms,j,r,i)
ρmmr,i
] ρar,i
ρmm
r,i


1
ρa
r,i
, (18)
where βj,r,i indicates sector i in region r’s share of domestic intermediates from sector j and
γs,j,r,i is the respective share of intermediate j sourced from region s. Note that in contrast
to most other CGE models, WIOD enables to model Armington bundles specific for each
sourcing sector. This additional structure not only allows to trace sectoral supply chains
more detailed but also creates additional variation in sectoral supply chain adjustments
as responses to the examined policy interventions. The overall production structure of
the CGE model and an illustration of how this relates to the analytical model is presented
in Figure 3.
Similar to the analytical model, a purchasing manager has two options if emitting
carbon becomes more expensive: On the one hand, she can replace energy with domestic
production factors. This ‘direct abatement action’ increases the intensity of domestic
16
production factors and hence reduces vertical specialisation indirectly. On the other hand,
she can offshore production to non-regulated regions by increasing the use of intermediates
from those regions. This mirrors what has been defined as vertical specialisation at the
intensive margin above. Depending on the respective input intensities and elasticities of
substitution, one of the two effects dominates and governs changes in the composition of
the supply chain. As it can be seen from Table 1, industries vary substantially in their
pre-policy input intensity of foreign intermediate use. Later, we identify this as the main
source in sectoral heterogeneous policy responses on the structure of supply chains.
Each region is represented by one aggregated representative agent who determines
final demand. The representative agent maximises her utility by purchasing bundles of
consumption goods subject to her budget constraint that equals factor income. Regarding
the final demand structure, we follow Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013) and
assume that utility of the representative agent is defined as a Leontief composite of all final
goods. Her budget is determined by factor and tax income and she supplies the factors of
production. These factors are mobile across sectors within regions but not across regions.
Further details on the CGE model are presented in the Appendix.
3.2 Data, Calibration and Aggregation
The model is calibrated to the year 2005 with the WIOD dataset.8 WIOD provides an
annually consistent representation of the world economy and contains production, trade
and emissions data for 35 sectors of 27 member states of the European Union plus 13
other major economies.
The originally 40 economies included in WIOD are aggregated to eight regions. Table
3 in the Appendix shows the regional aggregation in detail. Some model regions are large
countries, such as China or the United States; others are multi-country regions such as the
European Union (EU). The primal 35 sectors are aggregated to 18 sectors, details are given
in Table 4 in the Appendix. We focus on sectors where cross-border supply chains are
expected to be more relevant, such as in manufacturing. Thereby, we broaden the picture
generally drawn by the literature and not only consider the output when assessing the
8See Timmer, M. et al. (2012) and Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, and de Vries (2013) for an
extensive description of the dataset that can be downloaded at http://www.wiod.org. Data downloaded
on the 17th of April 2013 has been used for this analysis.
17
trade exposure of a sector but also its inputs and the sourcing of upstream intermediates.
Since service sectors have neither a high emission intensity nor have particularly intense
cross-border supply chains, several service sectors have been aggregated. Furthermore
we distinguish between three types of energy which are sourced from the three WIOD
sectors “coke, petroleum, nuclear fuel” (COPN), “mining and quarrying” (MINI), and
“electricity, gas, water supply” (ELGW).
For substitution elasticities determining the flexibility of production with regard to
inputs, estimates from Koesler and Schymura (forthcoming) are applied which are es-
timated from the same data the model is also calibrated to. The average elasticity of
substitution between value-added and energy (σld(r,i)) is 0.4, the minimum (maximum) is
0.1(1.1).9 The average substitutability between the value-added-energy composite and
material (σldx(r,i)) is 0.6 and varies from 0.1 to 2.3. An overview of the different elasticities
is also given in Table 1. The Armington elasticities required by the model are taken from
GTAP7 (Badri and Walmsley 2008, Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and Keeney 2007, Hertel,
McDougall, Narayanan, and Aguiar 2008) and mapped to WIOD sectors. The average
elasticity between domestic and foreign goods (σar,i) is 3.1 and varies between 1.6 and 4.4,
while the elasticity for the regional allocation of inputs (σmmr,i ) is 6.2 and ranges from 3.1
to 8.8.
3.3 Benchmark Situation
We define the degree of vertical specialisation of an industry as the foreign factor con-
tent that is not related to energy consumption per unit of output, corresponding to our
definition above. Note that due to the Armington trade structure a discrete offshoring
of entire production stages to non-regulated regions – defined in the analytical model as
vertical specialisation at the extensive margin – is ruled out. To compute the quantity
of factor content and later the amount of carbon embodied in sectoral output, we follow
the Multi-Region Input-Output (MRIO) literature (Peters 2008) and construct first an
input coefficient matrix A building on the multi-regional Input-Output Table provided
by WIOD:
9Note, Koesler and Schymura (forthcoming) do not provide a reliable σld(r,i) for the Coke, Refined
Petroleum. and Nuclear Fuel (CPN) sector. We assume that this elasticity is equal to the corresponding
elasticity of the chemical sector (0.717).
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Figure 4: Fraction of foreign non-energy factor content in 2005 for 18 European sectors.
A =


ιs,j,s,j . . . ιs,j,r,i
...
. . .
...
. . . . . . ιr,i,r,i,

 , (19)
with ιs,j,r,i as the input coefficient describing the use of good j in region s in sector i in
r. The Leontief inverse (I − A)−1 of A then provides all necessary information on the
structure of supply chains for all sectors in all regions. Multiplying the Leontief inverse
with a vector of factor content or carbon intensity and a vector of total sectoral output
subsequently allows to calculate the amount of non-regulated foreign factor or carbon
embodied in domestic output.
Figure 4 shows the foreign factor content in the output of European sectors in the year
2005. The content varies from 3.4 percent in the service sector (SERV) to 16.3 percent
in the energy intensive sector of coal, petroleum and nuclear (COPN) production. Apart
from services, sectors characterised with a low degree of fragmentation are upstream sec-
tors such as mining and quarrying (MINI), agriculture (AGRI) and construction (CONS).
More fragmented are on the one hand manufacturing sectors such as the production of
electronic equipment (ELEQ), transport equipment (TREQ), and machinery (MACH).
On the other hand, also European basic material sectors such as metals (META) and
chemicals (CHEM) are characterised with a high foreign factor content. But the two
groups differ in their emission intensity: Whereas ELEQ, TREQ, and MACH are sectors
with low emission intensity, META and CHEM emit are relatively carbon-intensive in the
production process.
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Figure 5: Fraction of foreign carbon content in 2005 for the 18 European sectors.
Obviously, not only value added has been collected along the supply chain but often
also emissions. Figure 5 illustrates the amount of foreign carbon embodied in EU sectoral
output. Its foreign carbon share ranges from 10.7 (ELGW) percent to 56.4 (ELEQ)
percent. In particular the European sectors that produce coke, petroleum and nuclear
fuel, but also electrical equipment – the most fragmented sector – contain high shares
of foreign embodied carbon. But note that both sectors feature very different absolute
values in embodied carbon. Sectors with only little foreign carbon embodied in their
production are the sectors associated to electricity gas and water supply (ELGW) as well
as non-metallic minerals such as cement where a large part of emission is added during
the last production stage.
3.4 Simulation Results
To quantify the magnitude of the effects identified in the analytical model, we study two
policy scenarios that correspond to the previous analysis. In the first scenario it is assumed
that the EU commits itself to unilaterally reduce its carbon emissions by 20 percent
relative to baseline of 2005. Thereby we assume that the required emission reductions
within the EU are granted by an ETS with full auctioning encompassing emissions in all
sectors. This can be seen as a stylized replication of EU 2020 climate policy, that aims
at reducing GHG emissions by 20 percent relative to the 1990 level by 2020.10 In other
regions, no emission reduction regulations are in place.
10For an more comprehensive assessment of this policy, see Bo¨hringer, Lo¨schel, Moslener, and Ruther-
ford (2009).
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Table 1: Input content and elasticities of European production in benchmark
Sector CO2 [
g
USD
] VA [%] E[%] NEG[%] FNEG[%] σld σldx σa σmm
TREQ 15.36 23.49 1.50 75.01 6.38 0.16 0.38 3.55 7.10
ELEQ 17.70 33.77 1.54 64.69 10.42 1.06 0.64 4.40 8.80
CONS 21.36 40.19 2.03 57.78 2.44 0.15 0.61 1.90 3.80
MACH 23.53 36.01 1.76 62.22 5.43 0.20 0.55 4.05 8.10
SERV 26.78 61.01 1.57 37.42 2.02 0.27 1.48 1.57 3.13
MANU 39.66 34.50 2.23 63.27 4.72 0.18 0.53 3.75 7.50
WOOD 53.07 32.48 2.98 64.54 4.43 0.21 0.71 3.40 6.80
TEXT 61.25 32.28 2.73 64.98 5.36 0.26 0.58 3.79 7.58
FOOD 62.86 26.77 2.67 70.56 3.93 0.19 0.63 3.00 6.00
PAPE 82.14 37.86 3.42 58.72 4.08 0.25 0.66 2.95 5.90
CHEM 168.55 32.57 6.50 60.94 6.64 0.57 0.87 3.30 6.60
META 272.96 32.53 6.64 60.83 6.02 1.01 0.11 3.75 7.50
AGRI 217.97 49.51 4.67 45.82 2.83 0.40 0.98 2.50 5.00
MINI 338.43 61.95 11.02 27.00 2.16 0.42 0.22 4.12 8.25
TRAN 348.12 43.76 5.38 50.85 3.42 0.48 0.45 1.90 3.80
ONME 940.16 37.45 12.70 49.85 2.82 0.25 0.81 2.90 5.80
COPN 533.54 12.25 59.47 28.27 9.81 0.72 0.42 2.10 4.20
ELGW 1948.75 40.55 35.03 24.42 3.10 0.46 0.68 2.80 5.60
Input content from WIOD and elasticities from Koesler and Schymura (forthcoming) (σld,
σldx) and Badri and Walmsley (2008) (σa, σmm).
VA: value-added, E: energy, NEG: non-energy intermediates, FNEG: foreign non-energy
intermediates, σld: substitution elasticity between factor input and energy, σldx: substitu-
tion elasticity between factor-energy composite and intermediate composite, σa: Armington
elasticity between domestic and foreign goods, σmm: Armington elasticity between goods
from different foreign regions.
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In the second policy scenario, we supplement the unilateral domestic climate policy of
the EU by a border tax on all carbon that is embodied in imports into the EU. Embodied
carbon is calculated by taking into account the carbon emitted along the supply chain
when entering the jurisdiction of the EU and descending from non-regulated regions.
Thus, we account for a possible multi-regulation of emissions at different production
stages of a good. The imported embodied carbon is priced according to the prevailing
price of carbon in the ETS regulating EU emissions. The introduction of a border tax in
turn implies that carbon emissions arising in non-EU regions also become costly if they
are imported into the EU.
3.4.1 Unilateral Carbon Pricing
Figure 6 shows how foreign factor content in the 18 different sectors of our EU econ-
omy change under the two scenarios. As in the analytical framework, sectors are ranked
according their emission intensity. The unilateral European policy to reduce carbon emis-
sions by 20 percent (Figure 6a) indeed alters the sourcing of intermediates in European
sectors. The median increase in vertical specialisation is 3.3 percent. In particular indus-
tries with a high emission intensity such as as electricity, gas and water supply (ELGW,
+21.2%), the production of metal products (META,+8.5%) or other non-metallic miner-
als (ONME, +13.1%) are becoming more dependent on foreign intermediates and more
vertically specialised. To a smaller extent, but due to the size of the sectors also im-
portant, the European chemical industries (CHEM, +3.9%) and manufacturing (MANU,
+3.2%) offshore production capacities to non-regulated regions and increase the share
of non-European value added in their final output. Several industries – such as services
(SERV, -3.1%) or electrical equipment (ELEQ, -1.5%) – become less fragmented and re-
duce the use of foreign input. In general the results from the more complex calibrated
CGE model reflect the Insight 2 derived from the analytical model.
But including additional data on the sectoral structure – differences in elasticities of
substitution and heterogeneous value shares – leads to a more complex picture. In order
to decompose the sector’s offshoring reactions to the policy interventions, we leave for a
moment the general equilibrium perspective and turn our attention again to the cross-
price elasticity of domestic energy with regard to foreign factor content. To keep this
analytically tractable we have to work with several simplifying assumptions that become
22
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(a) Unilateral carbon pricing (b) Unilateral carbon pricing
and border tax
Figure 6: Changes in vertical specialisation for European sectors relative to benchmark
scenario for the two scenarios.
resolved when turning back to the numerical model. We use energy price changes as a
proxy for carbon price changes, assuming that a marginal carbon price change leads to
an identical energy price change in each sector, thus neglecting sector differences in the
energy composition as well as process emissions. Further, we only consider the last two
stages in the supply chain.
The cross-derivative can be computed using the calibrated demand function for foreign
value added embodied in upstream intermediates of sector i in region r and then take the
derivative with respect to domestic energy price change. The cross-price elasticity χlsr,i
consists of two components: The first component captures the change in foreign factor
content induced by a energy price change in the final stage. The second component
captures the shift to foreign factor content induced by a price change of domestic energy
in upstream intermediate goods.
χlsr,i =
∑
j
∑
s
∂lr,i,s,j
∂per,i
per,i
lr,i,s,j
= (1− θr,i)αr,iσ
ldx
i
+
∑
j
∑
s
θr,iβj,r,i(1− θs,j)αs,j
[
σldxj −
σldxj
θr,i
+
σa
θr,i(1− βj,r,i)αs,j
]
,
(20)
where lr,i,s,j describes the foreign factor content finally used in the last production stage
of sector i in region r, sourced from region s and sector j and per,i is the price index of the
energy bundle used in sector i in region r.
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The first component, the direct offshoring effect is increasing in energy-intensity of the
sector and the elasticity of substitution between energy and value added, similar to the
analytical model (see Insight 2). The second component describes the shift from domestic
to foreign intermediates if the domestic energy price increases.
The different panels in Figure 7 depict the calibrated cross-price elasticities and il-
lustrate how the offshoring response evolves when adding additional structure to sector’s
characteristics. The first panel (a) assumes that as in the analytical model, energy-
intensity increases linearly between sectors. The second panel (b) shows offshoring reac-
tions when sectors differ in their energy-intensity, now calibrated with WIOD data and
assuming all other input intensities and elasticities are equal across sectors. The third
panel (c) additionally includes data on the sectoral and regional heterogeneity in the in-
tensity of intermediates use. Finally, the last panel (d) in Figure 7 accounts for further
differences in the elasticities of substitution.
With an increase in vertical specialisation of 4.5 percent in the CGE runs, the coke,
petroleum and nuclear fuel sector (COPN) for example features a lower offshoring re-
sponse than one would have expected given its relatively high level of energy intensity.
Studying the associated cross-price elasticity reveals that its relatively high share of for-
eign intermediate moderates the policy impact to this sector. Accordingly, incorporating
sectoral differences in the benchmark sourcing of intermediates in the calibration of the
production functions leads to a drop in the cross-price elasticity under scrutiny.
However, the decrease in vertical specialisation of the service (SERV) and electrical
equipment (ELEQ) sector cannot directly be explained by differences in cross-price elas-
ticities. Both sectors are characterized by a particularly low energy and emission intensity
and are directly only slightly affected by the higher energy costs. In addition, both sectors
are relatively value added intensive and benefit from the decrease in the price of value
added (-4.7%) that follows the implementation of the emission reduction policy in Eu-
rope. So eventually also general equilibrium effects that resonate through the economy
have an important impact on the structure of supply chains and should be considered
when studying the vertical specialisation effects of policies.
Obviously, changes in the vertical structure of an industry and the respective supply
chain adjustments also lead to changes in the amount and source of emissions embodied
in an industries’ output. We measure the change in the origin of carbon that is embodied
24
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(c) (d)
Figure 7: Cross-price elasticities of demand for foreign value added with regard to changes
in European energy prices parameterised with different values for input intensities. Panel
(a) assumes that energy intensity increases linearly from sector to sector and that sectors
are otherwise the same. Panel (b) accounts for actual differences in the energy intensity of
EU sectors. Panel (c) adds structure regarding the origin of foreign intermediate intensity.
Panel (d) further accounts for estimated elasticities.
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(a) Unilateral carbon pricing (b) Unilateral carbon pricing
and border tax
Figure 8: Changes of foreign embodied carbon in European output relative to Benchmark.
in a unit of output as:
∆CEUi =
∆ecNoEUi
∆ecEUi
, (21)
where ∆ecNoEUi is the change in embodied carbon from non-European sources and ∆ec
EU
i
the change in embodied carbon from European sources, both in output of industry i
relative to the Benchmark. Note that an increase of non-European carbon embodied
in European output due to lower prices of non-European energy intensive intermediates
is one part of what generally encompasses carbon leakage. The change in the origin of
carbon in non-European industries’ supply chains is presented in Figure 8. All sectors
apart of the transportation sector (TRAN) increase the amount of embodied carbon from
non-EU regions.
Unilateral Emission Pricing with Border Emission Taxes Changes in composi-
tion of the supply chain if the EU’s domestic carbon pricing is complemented by a border
tax on all carbon that is embodied in imports into the EU are shown in Figure 6b. With a
median decrease of 13.6 percent, vertical specialisation drops significantly for virtually all
industries. The strongest drop takes place in metal production (META, -24.9%), which
in Europe relies heavily on carbon intensive intermediate inputs from abroad. The sector
with the smallest but still very much noticeable drop of 7.0 percent is the sector related
to the supply of coke, petroleum and nuclear products (COPN).
According to our Insight 5, the introduction of a border carbon tax in the EU reduces
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Figure 9: Changes in sales of European goods to final consumers in all other non-regulated
regions with border taxes relative to the scenario with only European unilateral emission
pricing.
the competitiveness in foreign markets for industries that depend on foreign emission-
intensive intermediates. The border tax increases the costs of these goods, leading to sales
losses in foreign regions since consumers switch to goods from producers with untaxed
supply chains. Figure 9 shows similar findings that emerge from the CGE model. Virtually
all European sectors face a reduction in final demand in non-regulated regions (Median
-0.25 %). The most affected sector is agriculture (AGRI, -0.65%). The negative effect
is stronger for goods where non-EU carbon is embodied to a larger extent, that is for
example electrical or transport equipment (ELEQ,-0.19%; TREQ, -0.26%).
3.4.2 General Impacts of the Policies
After having focused on the consequences of unilateral climate policy on the vertical
structure of EU industries we turn now our attention towards the general implications
of those policies. Table 2 summarizes the change in key economic indicators for the EU.
If the EU reduces its emissions unilaterally, GDP in the EU falls by 0.48 percent and
welfare, measured in Hicksian equivalence, drops by 0.50 percent. Imports and exports
are reduced by 4.63 percent and 4.25 percent, respectively.
The observed carbon leakage rate of 39 percent is relatively high, but consistent with
findings from Bednar-Friedl, Schinko, and Steininger (2012) who also account for process
emissions. Besides the EU, in particular Russia and ROW are negatively affected by the
EU policy seeing their GDP fall by 0.40 percent and 0.19 percent, respectively. Their
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Table 2: Summary of change in key economic indicators in the EU [%]
Unilateral emission Unilateral emission
pricing pricing and border tax
GDP -0.48 -0.38
Exports -4.25 -21.79
Imports -4.63 -22.08
Welfare -0.50 -0.31
Carbon leakage 39.46 25.75
welfare decreases by 0.40 percent and 0.14 percent, respectively, mainly caused by a drop
in energy exports of these regions to the EU.
The implementation of a border carbon tax eases the effect of the unilateral carbon
pricing in the EU. GDP losses amount 0.38 percent only while welfare falls by 0.31 percent
relative to our no-policy baseline. But it comes at the cost of strong reductions in exports
(−21.79%) and imports (−22.08%), as decribed in Insight 4. The border tax, however,
reduces carbon leakage by almost 14 percentage points. Thus, the theoretically possible
outcome that a border tax induces sufficient large offshoring such that carbon leakage
increases, as described in Insight 5, can not be observed within the calibrated parameter
values. The border carbon tax leads shifts the burden of climate policy between regions.
Under a sole unilateral carbon price, the EU bears the majority of policy costs. But the
carbon tax results shifts the burden to the exporters of energy and energy-intensive goods
to the EU. As a result, a EU border carbon tax reduces Russia’s welfare by more than 4
percent. But also China is significantly affected, coping with welfare losses of 1 percent.
4 Summary and Conclusion
The evolution of global supply chains reshapes the economic landscape with consequences
for the effectiveness of unilateral environmental regulations. We analyse the general mech-
anism of offshoring fragments of the supply chain due to unilateral regulation in the form
of emission pricing and an import tax of embodied emissions with an analytical partial
equilibrium model of a two stage production process that can be distributed between two
regions. With this simplified model at hand, we are able to distinguish between offshoring
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at the extensive margin, i.e. the fragmentation of the supply chain by offshoring entire
production stages to unregulated regions, and offshoring at the intensive margin, which
captures changes in foreign factor content in domestic industries.
We find that unilateral emission reduction polices force more emission-intensive pro-
ducers to offshore a greater part of their supply chain to the unregulated region and
thereby increasing vertical specialisation at the extensive as well as at the intensive mar-
gin. Border carbon taxation in turn is successful in fetching these stages back home.
But with the negative side effect that it may also force some industries that depend on
energy-intensive upstream inputs to move entirely to unregulated regions.
In reality, though, the production network is far more complex and interweaved be-
tween sectors. Therefore, we extend next the analysis to a full-fledged CGE model that
is calibrated using WIOD data and investigate the implications of an unilateral carbon
reduction policy by the EU. Overall, the findings of the CGE model corroborate the the-
oretical analysis. But as input-intensities and elasticities of substitution determine the
offshore opportunities, the magnitudes of offshoring responses vary across sectors.
When the EU unilaterally implements a 20 percent reduction in emissions, sectors
increase vertical specialisation by up to 21 percent, whereas the median sector increases its
degree of vertical specialisation by about 3 percent. While overall carbon leakage amounts
to 39 percent, changes in the supply chain of sectors cause an increase in embodied carbon
from non-European sources for most industries. If the EU complements its unilateral
reduction policy with a border tax on all imported embodied carbon, offshoring is stopped.
On the contrary, in such a situation supply chains shrink notably and as a side effect EU
sectors loose market shares in foreign markets since their input-intensive industries loose
competitiveness.
Overall, our study reveals that unilateral regulation may have effects on the production
structures of industries and complement other drivers such as transportation costs in
shaping the global supply chains. Production relocation also has implications on the
overall emission-intensity of the good. Hence, researchers and policy makers alike should
not only consider direct effects such as the trade exposition of sectors when discussing
unilateral policy measures but also include less tangible but still important effects on the
composition of global supply chains..
However, in order to be able to assess these effects comprehensively, more research
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is necessary. It is particularly important to better understand how supply chains can
be fragmented and offshored, and how much flexibility industries have to adjust their
supply chains. Hence, better data is needed, in particular global multi-regional input
output datasets with a higher sectoral resolution. In addition, the interaction of the
different drivers of vertical specialisation such as unilateral policy, energy prices, and
transport costs needs further research in order to be able to derive better indications
of how supply chains response to policy changes. Fragmentation also often means more
transport and thus more emissions. This nexus is also important for a comprehensive
inclusion of global supply chain behavior that is necessary in order to design effective and
efficient environmental regulations.
5 Acknowledgments
Oliver Schenker gratefully acknowledges the support from the German Federal Ministry
of Education and Research within the Call “O¨konomie des Klimawandels” (funding code
01LA1105B: Climate Policy and the Growth Pattern of Nations (CliPoN)). Simon Koesler
and Andreas Lo¨schel gratefully acknowledge the support of the the 7th EU-framework
project “WIOD: World Input-Output Database: Construction and Applications” under
Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities, Grant agreement no. 225 281. We
thank Carolyn Fischer, Hermann Held, and Glen Peters for discussions and suggestions.
The paper benefited also from discussions at presentations at the final conference of
the WIOD project in Groningen, the MCC in Berlin, ZEW, RFF in Washington, the
EAERE 2013 meeting in Toulouse, the AERE 2013 meeting in Banff, and the University
of Hamburg. The authors claim responsibility for all errors and shortcomings herein.
References
Armington, P. S. (1969): “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place
of Production,” IMF Staff Papers, 16(1), 159–178.
Badri, N. G., and T. L. Walmsley (2008): “Global Trade, Assistance, and Produc-
tion: The GTAP 7 Data Base,” Discussion paper, Center for Global Trade Analysis,
Purdue University.
30
Baldwin, R., and J. Lopez-Gonzalez (forthcoming): “Supply-chain Trade: A Por-
trait of Global Patterns and Several Testable Hypotheses,” The World Economy.
Bednar-Friedl, B., T. Schinko, and K. W. Steininger (2012): “The relevance of
process emissions for carbon leakage: A comparison of unilateral climate policy options
with and without border carbon adjustment,” Energy Economics, 24(S2), S168–S180.
Benarroch, M., and R. Weder (2006): “Intra-industry trade in intermediate prod-
ucts, pollution and internationally increasing returns,” Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 52(3), 675 – 689.
Bo¨hringer, C., A. Lo¨schel, U. Moslener, and T. F. Rutherford (2009): “EU
climate policy up to 2020: An economic impact assessment,” Energy Economics, 31,
Supplement 2(0), S295 – S305, International, U.S. and E.U. Climate Change Control
Scenarios: Results from EMF 22.
Copeland, B. R. (1996): “Pollution content tariffs, environmental rent shifting, and
the control of cross-border pollution,” Journal of International Economics, 40(3-4),
459–476.
Copeland, B. R., and M. S. Taylor (1994): “North-South Trade and the Environ-
ment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), 755–87.
Costinot, A., J. Vogel, and S. Wang (2012): “An Elementary Theory of Global
Supply Chains,” The Review of Economic Studies.
Dietzenbacher, E., B. Los, R. Stehrer, M. P. Timmer, and G. J. de Vries
(2013): “The construction of world input-output tables in the WIOD project,” Eco-
nomic Systems Research, 25(1), 71–98.
Dietzenbacher, E., J. Pei, and C. Yang (2012): “Trade, production fragmenta-
tion, and China’s carbon dioxide emissions,” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 64(1), 88 – 101.
Dirkse, S. P., and M. C. Ferris (1993): The PATH Solver: A non-monotone stabi-
lization scheme for mixed complementarity problems. Computer Sciences Department
of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA.
31
Dornbusch, R., S. Fischer, and P. Samuelson (1977): “Comparative advantage,
trade, and payments in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods,” The American
Economic Review, 67(5), 823–839.
Fischer, C., and A. K. Fox (2012): “Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leak-
age: Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates,” Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 64, 199–216.
Grossman, G., and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2006): “The rise of offshoring: it’s not wine
for cloth anymore,” The New Economic Geography: Effects and Policy Implications,
pp. 59–102.
(2008): “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring,” American Economic
Review, 98(5), 1978–1997.
(2012): “Task trade between similiar countries,” Econometrica, 80(2), 593–629.
Herrendorf, B., R. Rogerson, and k. Valentinyi (2013): “Two Perspectives
on Preferences and Structural Transformation,” American Economic Review, 103(7),
2752–89.
Hertel, T., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic, and R. Keeney (2007): “How confident can
we be of CGE-based assessments of Free Trade Agreements?,” Economic Modelling,
24(4), 611–635.
Hertel, T., R. McDougall, B. Narayanan, and A. Aguiar (2008): “GTAP 7
Data Base Documentation - Chapter 14: Behavioral Parameters,” Technical Report,
Center for Global Trade Analysis, West Lafayette, USA.
Hummels, D., J. Ishii, and K. Yi (2001): “The nature and growth of vertical special-
ization in world trade,” Journal of International Economics, 54(1), 75–96.
Koesler, S., and F. Pothen (2013): “The Basic WIOD CGE Model: A Computable
General Equilibrium Model Based on the World Input-Output Database,” ZEW Doku-
mentation 13-04, Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW).
Koesler, S., and M. Schymura (forthcoming): “Substitution elasticities in a Con-
stant Elasticity of Substitution framework - Empirical estimates using nonlinear least
squares,” Economic Systems Research.
32
Markusen, J. R. (1975): “International externalities and optimal tax structures,” Jour-
nal of International Economics, 5(1), 15–29.
McAusland, C. (2004): “Environmental regulation as export promotion: Product stan-
dards for dirty intermediate goods,” Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy,
3(2), 1–39.
Peters, G. (2008): “From production-based to consumption-based national emission
inventories,” Ecological Economics, 65(1), 13–23.
Rutherford, T. F. (1999): “Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as
a GAMS Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax,” Compu-
tational Economics, 14(1-2), 1–46.
Sturgeon, T. J., and O. Memedovic (2010): “Mapping Global Value Chains: Inter-
mediate Goods Trade and Structural Change in the World Economy,” Working Paper
05/2010, United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
Timmer, M. et al. (2012): “The World Input-Output Database (WIOD): Contents,
Sources and Methods,” Discussion paper, University Groningen.
Yi, K. (2003): “Can vertical specialization explain the growth of world trade?,” Journal
of Political Economy, 111(1), 52–102.
33
A Appendix
A.1 Proof Insight 3
The cut-off determining the outsourcing of upstream production to S as in condition (13)
is:
A1Γ(z) ≡
A1N
A1S
(
α(z)τN + (1− α(z))τS
τS
) 1
1−α(z)
≤
wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (22)
By assumption A1 ≥ ω. Thus, it becomes clear that Γ(z) ≤ T (z) must hold for (13)
to hold. Since 0 < α(z) < 1, Γ(z) can attain values in the interval limα(z)→0 Γ(z) = 1 and
limα(z)→1 Γ(z) =
τN
τS
.
At the lower bound of α(z),
lim
α(z)→0
Γ(z) = 1 < lim
α(z)→0
T (z) = 1 (23)
must hold.
Since τN > τS , (23) never holds, at the upper bound of α(z)
lim
α(z)→1
Γ(z) =
τN
τS
< lim
α(z)→1
T (z) =
τN
τS
(24)
must hold.
Since τN > τS , (24) never holds for α(z) < 1, (13) can never hold either.
A.2 Description of CGE Model
In our numerical assessment we make use of an task specific version of the Basic WIOD
CGE model. This model is a static, multi-region, multi-sector CGE model that has been
designed in order to allow researchers to use the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
in a CGE model. A comprehensive description of this model is provided by Koesler and
Pothen (2013).
The model we use in this analysis distinguishes between two groups of commodities:
energy commodities yr,eg and non-energy commodities yr,neg. The production of these
goods is characterised by production functions with constant elasticities of substitution
(CES) and constant returns to scale. Nested CES functions with two levels are employed
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Figure 10: Structure of commodity production.
to specify the substitution possibilities between a factor composite lr,i, energy dr,i and
a non-energy intermediate composite xr,i of sectoral production. An overview of the
production structure is given in Figure 10 and the corresponding zero-profit condition is
given in Equation 25. Thereby and for all following CES functions, pi denotes profits. The
arguments of the CES function is given in parentheses and the corresponding elasticity of
substitution in the upper index. Small p’s are prices of commodities and factors.
piYr,i ≤CES
σldxr,i
r,i
[
pxr,i;CES
σldr,i
r,i (plr,i; pdr,i)
]
(25)
Energy dr,i and the intermediate composite xr,i are a Leontief combination of energy
commodities and non-energy commodities respectively.
Sectoral output can be used for intermediate use and/or final consumption domesti-
cally and/or exported to other regions. Perfect competition is assumed in all markets.
The choice among imports and domestically produced commodities is based on Arming-
ton’s idea of regional product differentiation (Armington 1969), i.e. domestic and foreign
goods are not necessarily perfect substitutes and in combination form an Armington ag-
gregate. In our setup however, Armington goods are not only region specific to account for
regional differences in preference for domestic and foreign goods, but also sector specific
in order to allow intermediates to be traced from their origin to their destination. Given
the focus of our analysis, we abstract from other potential trade distortions. Figure 11
gives an overview of the underlying Armington structure and Equations 26 and 27 present
the zero-profit and market clearance conditions for international commodity markets. yr,i
is domestic production, ys,i is production by foreign regions and mi,s,mkt are imports of
commodity i of market mkt (final demand and sectors) in region s. While the Arming-
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Figure 11: Structure of Armington aggregate.
ton elasticity σar,i governs the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, σ
mm
r,i
affects the substitution between the same good from different regions.
piAi,r,mkt ≤CES
σar,i
i,r,mkt
[
pyr,i;CES
σmmr,i
i,r,mkt(pys,i)
]
, with s 6= r (26)
mi,r,mkt ≥
∑
s;s 6=r
(
∂piAi,r,mkt
∂pys,i
Ai,r,mkt
)
(27)
Each region is represented by one aggregated representative agent who determines
final demand. The representative agent maximises his utility by purchasing bundles of
consumption goods subject to his budget constraint. Utility of the representative agent
Ur is given as a Leontief composite of energy ar,eg and a non-energy Armington goods
ar,neg. The related zero-profit condition is:
piU(r) ≤CES
0
[
CES0(pa(neg,r)), CES
0(pa(eg,r))
]
. (28)
As described in Equation 29, the budget is determined by factor and tax income. The
agent supplies a fix amount of factors. Factors are mobile across sectors within regions
but not across regions.
Br =plr
∑
i
(lr,i) (29)
Besides standard economic activity, the model makes provisions for the accounting
of CO2. Thereby the model distinguishes between energy related emissions and process
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emissions from sectoral production as well as consumption. From a modelling perspective,
when emissions are related to energy, they occur during the production process parallel to
the use of energy. Process emission in turn are understood as a byproduct of production
and consumption and are thus tied to sectoral output and final demand.
The equilibrium is characterised through three types of equilibrium conditions, market
clearance conditions for all commodities and factors, income balances and zero profit con-
ditions. The variables defining the equilibrium are activity levels for the constant-returns-
to-scale production, commodity and factor prices, and the price of final consumption. The
market clearance condition related to the production of commodities is:
yr,i ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piyr,ii
∂py(r,i)
yr,ii
)
+
∑
fd
(
∂piUr
∂pyr,i
Ur
)
+
∑
s;r 6=s
∑
mkt
(
∂piai,s,mkt
∂pyr,i
ai,s,mkt
)
.
(30)
The market clearance condition for final demand is:
Br ≥Ur. (31)
For factor markets the following market clearance conditions must hold:
lr,i ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piYr,ii
∂plr
Yr,ii
)
. (32)
The model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) in GAMS using
the MPSGE syntax Rutherford (1999). The model is solved using the PATH solver (Dirkse
and Ferris (1993)).
A.3 Aggregation Scheme
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Table 3: Regional aggregation.
Short Region Associated WIOD Region
BRA Brazil BRA
CHN China CHN
EAS Other East Asia JPN, KOR, TWN
EU European Union (EU27) AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST,
FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX,
LVA, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, SVN, SWE
IND India IND
RUS Russia RUS
USA United States of America USA
ROW Rest of the World AUS, CAN, IDN, MEX, ROW, TUR
Table 4: Sectoral aggregation.
Short Sectors Associated WIOD Sectors
FOOD Food, Beverages, Tobacco 15t16
TEXT Textiles, Leather, Footwear 17t18, 19
WOOD Wood Products 20
PAPE Pulp, Paper, Printing, Publication 21t22
COPN Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 23
CHEM Chemicals, Rubber, Plastic 24, 25
ONME Other Non-metallic mineral 26
META Basic Metals, Fabric. Met. 27t28
MACH Machinery Nec. 29
ELEQ Electrical & Optical Equi. 30t33
TREQ Transport Equipment 34t35
MANU Manufacturing Nec., Recycling 36t37
TRAN Transport Activities 60, 61, 62, 63
AGRI Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing AtB
MINI Mining and Quarrying C
ELGW Electricity, Gas, Water E
CONS Construction F
SERV Sale, Tourism, Financial Services, Health 50,51,52,H,64,J,70,71t74,L,M,N,O,P
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